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1.  Introduction 
In the preamble to the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties it is ‘noted’ that ‘the 
principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are 
universally recognized’.1  What is to be made of this prefatory affirmation, however, 
is less clear. On the one hand, and as was consistently reiterated through the drafting 
of the Convention at the hands of various Special Rapporteurs in the International 
Law Commission, the idea of free consent appears to be an indispensable ingredient 
in any understanding of the law of treaties. As Fitzmaurice was to put it, the ‘mutual 
consent of the parties, and the reality of consent on the part of each party, is an 
essential condition of the validity of any treaty’.2  On the other hand, however, the 
very ubiquity of consent as an analytic—governing everything from the 
underpinnings of treaty obligation (pacta sunt servanda and good faith), to 
processural dimensions (competence, signature, ratification, accession and approval), 
conditions of validity (capacity, error, fraud, mistake, coercion), interpretation 
(travaux preparatoires) and effect (pacta tertiis etc.)—is such as to make it very 
much more difficult to isolate what consent actually means in this context.3 Whether, 
for example, it is to be understood as the instantiation of a practice of autonomy (self-
rule),4 as a processural trigger providing for the imposition of certain obligations,5 or 
																																																								
1 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331, 
preamble.  See, also, 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 
(VCSSRT), 1946 UNTS 3, preamble. 
 
2 G.G. Fitzmaurice, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/115 and 
Corr. 1 (1958), 19, p. 25 (paragraph 7). 
 
3 For a discussion of the ‘different kinds of consent’, see S. Rosenne, ‘“Consent” and 
Related Words in the Codified Law of Treaties’ in S. Rosenne (ed.), An International Law 
Miscellany (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 357-377. 
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as a convergence of wills (a meeting of minds)6 may depend upon where one starts, or 
which aspects of treaty law one takes as fundamental. In that sense, the most 
significant or, perhaps, elucidatory features of the law of treaties (if one understands it 
as a systemically coherent enterprise) might be thought to be found in the places in 
which consent appears to be either entirely absent (duress, succession, objective 
agreements) or where its effects are systematically constrained by other factors (rebus 
sic stantibus, necessity, force majeure and jus cogens). Only, it might be argued, by 
looking at the limits of freedom of contract may one discern what it is that such 
freedom seems to imply or entail.   
 
This itself may immediately put a number of questions in the frame: to what extent is 
consent indispensable for the assumption of obligations under treaties? May 
conventional obligations be assumed/imposed absent consent? What is required by 
way of consent? What is its practical content? In what contexts is consent 
sufficient/insufficient, effective/ineffective? At what moments may it be left aside? If, 
in method, I am attracted to the idea that the positive content (if any) of the idea of 
consent is to be discerned through the medium of its potential displacement (the point 
at which it ‘ends’), there is also another sense of its ‘ends’ to which I also want to 
draw attention—that which concerns what it enables or produces as a discursive 
practice. My hypothesis, here, is that the idea of consent is more than simply an 
instrumental medium by which other things are to be achieved (as a vehicle for social 
transactions of one kind or another), but operates as a way of producing that to which 
it seeks to give effect: namely, a legal world configured around the idea that it is the 
systematic outcome of acts of collective free will rather than of coercion. Consent, in 
other words, takes itself as its own end. 																																																																																																																																																														
4 See, e.g., G. Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge: Ein Beintrag zur 
juristischen (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1880). In the field of contract law, see C. Fried, Contract 
as Promise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
 
5 G.G. Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/107 
(1957), 42, n. 33 (‘Consent is only a method … by which obligations arise or come into force; 
but it is not the foundation of the binding force of the obligation once it has come into force.  
It is not consent that makes consent binding, for if it depended on that it would be necessary 
to provide yet another principle in order to give it juridical force to the consent that made 
consent binding’).  See further G.G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of 
International Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, Mod. L. Rev., 19 (1956), 1-13, at 8. 
 
6 Cf. Arts. 31 and 32 VCLT. 
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Lying behind this general hypothesis are two related theoretical or methodological 
intuitions.  The first is that consent, as an idea, operates as a way of linking domestic 
and international authority by seeking to secure the validity of international 
transactions by reference to the conditioning grounds of (territorial) sovereignty.  Its 
content, however, has not remained entirely stable. Despite a prevailing sense of the 
necessity of adopting a position of ostensible neutrality towards the operative 
conditions of domestic political arrangements, one may note the shift from a 
conception of consent premised upon the keeping of the sovereigns’ promises to a 
modern, popular, perhaps democratic, notion of consent as ‘self-rule’.7  Whether or 
not there be a right to democratic government, or to popular control over the exercise 
of foreign policy, the practice of consent (by which I mean both the performance of 
formalities by which a State engages itself internationally and the rhetoric that 
underpins it) is such as to keep those agendas alive. 
 
The second, related, intuition is that that if consent is to operate as a category of 
evaluation against which one might test the validity of international transactions, it 
does so not because it is intuited that the necessary conditions are already in place, but 
because (in part at least) it seeks to operationalize those conditions, and bring them 
into fruition.  Consent, in these terms, is better understood as a practice concerned 
with the ‘production’ of both domestic and international authority through the 
performance of a range of largely formal, and symbolic, acts the purpose of which is 
to demonstrate the existence of a pre-existent right to govern, but yet on grounds that 
are constantly in the process of being established.  As such, one is left with the almost 
impossible formulation: ‘the practice of consent is concerned with the production of 
consent as desire’. 
 
In the course of this chapter, I will attempt to elucidate these ideas in three stages: 
first through a discussion of the place of consent, more generally, in international law 
outlining its productive characteristics; secondly through a brief account of its 
emergence in international legal history; and finally through an account of its ‘limits’ 
																																																								
7 On which see Philip Allott, ‘Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea’, AJIL, 77 (1983), 
1-30, at 24-25. 
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that brings to the fore the problem of producing an idea of consent that is ‘authentic’ 
under conditions of social constraint. 
 
2. Consent and Will 
If consent appears, most visibly, as a structuring feature of treaty law it may 
nevertheless be said to reflect a more general condition of international law. As the 
Permanent Court of International Justice suggested in the Lotus Case, consent was to 
be understood as a fundamental legitimating condition: ‘the rules of law binding upon 
states’ are only those that ‘emanate from their own free will’.8 This was to emphasize 
at least two (somewhat contrasting) ideas. In the first place, it was to identify a 
common ground for both custom and treaty law.9 Rather than imagine treaties as 
being merely formal, ‘private’, arrangements concluded under cover of general law 
(the law of treaties), it was to provide a rationality that enabled one to link the 
substantive content of treaties to the emergence of general international law (in which 
both formal and tacit consent is registered). As Lauterpacht was to put it, consent 
could thus be understood as a ‘formal source’ which ‘finds its partial materialization 
in custom and treaty which sit in relation to it as material sources.’10 Treaties, on this 
score, are not merely formalized through consent (to obligation), but are also evidence 
of consent (to law). In the second place, if the Permanent Court was overtly to assert a 																																																								
8 Lotus Case, PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 10 (1927), p. 18. 
 
9 Rasulov suggests that this commonality is no longer apparent in ‘modern doctrinal 
consciousness’ in which the ‘processes of customary norm-production must ultimately be 
grounded in the logic of belief and perception… rather than any kind of tacit consent or 
deliberate choice.’ A. Rasulov, ‘The Doctrine of Sources in the Discourse of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice’ in C.J. Tams and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Legacies of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 271-318, at p. 
276. For an early critique of the mythic character of consent, see J.L. Brierly, The Law of 
Nations (H. Waldock ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 52-53 (‘The truth is that 
states do not regard their international legal relations as resulting from consent except where 
the consent is express, and that the theory of implied consent is a fiction invented by the 
theorist’). 
 
10 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International 
Law’, BYbIL, 10 (1929), 65-95, at 81.  For an early statement, see G.F. de Martens, Précis du 
Droit des Gens Moderne de L’Europe (Vol. I) (Paris: Guillaume & Co., 1838), Ch. ii, s. 46 
(in which he distinguishes between three categories of ‘volonté’—express, tacit or presumed 
that give rise to three sources of law—‘conventions expresses’, ‘conventions tacite’, and 
‘l’observance or l’usage’.) For a review of the late nineteenth and early twentieth Century 
literature see P.E. Corbett, ‘The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations’, 
BYbIL, 6 (1925), 20-30.  
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broadly ‘empirico-positivist’ conception of law here (one whose sources were 
confined to the material practices of States), it was also to situate this within a broader 
legal environment in which States were presumed to enjoy an otherwise untrammelled 
freedom of action. Treaty-making, on such an analysis, takes the character of a 
restriction on the sovereignty of States assumed in virtue of an act of self-limitation in 
which the demonstrable characteristics of ‘consent’ are the key. Thus, as the 
Permanent Court was to suggest in the Wimbledon Case, a treaty engagement might 
be said to consist of a ‘restriction upon the exercise of sovereign rights of the State’ 
enacted in consequence of an exercise of sovereignty.11   
 
This idea of consent as an act of ‘self-limitation’ has its obvious limits.  It is evident, 
to begin with, that within the context of treaty law, consent is clearly not an 
unregulated phenomenon. Not only is consent in some cases ineffective or insufficient 
(governed by considerations of process, validity and subsequent change), but consent 
is also occasionally unnecessary (e.g. in case of succession to treaties).12 Consent is 
also hemmed in by rules relating to duress and the subsequent interpretation of 
agreements.  If self-limitation remains a viable descriptive category, in that sense, it is 
an act of limitation capable of being performed only under terms already largely 
determined in advance.  And this is to draw attention to the way in which the Vienna 
Convention itself both performs and subverts its own content. On the one hand, as a 
treaty, it is conditioned by the effectiveness of the rules it elaborates (the rules 
contained within the Convention stipulating the effect of its own ratification); on the 
other hand, it also purports to establish rules whose application necessarily exceed the 
limits of its own form (these are general rules, not simply rules for the contracting 
parties).13 
																																																								
11 Wimbledon Case (1923) PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 1 p. 25.  To the same effect see 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua: Nicaragua v USA (Merits, 
Judgment) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14, at p. 131 (paragraph 259) (‘A State … is sovereign for the 
purpose of accepting a limitation of its sovereignty [by way of treaty]’). Rasulov adds a 
suggestive gloss to this: ‘the more effectively the given state finds its hands tied by 
international law, the more convincingly it thus reaffirms its sovereignty’: Rasulov, supra n. 9, 
p. 279. 
 
12 See below, at pp. ___-___ 
 
13 See I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2nd ed. 1984), pp. 3-5. It was for such reasons that Fitzmaurice 
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In the second place, there is a question as to whether the generic standpoint articulated 
in the Lotus Case is analytically coherent as a way of understanding the effect of 
consent in treaties. To some degree this is a question that goes to the different 
implications of the two terms in operation here: ‘will’ and ‘consent’.  An act of ‘will’ 
has distinctively active connotations suggestive of a power, or a capacity, to create 
law. Consent, by contrast, seems to evoke a passive idea of acceptance, or of a dutiful 
concession. Each speaks in a particular way to the text of a treaty: one as the desire to 
impose obligations on others, the other as an agreement to have obligations imposed 
upon oneself. Each also conceptualises the relationship between law and power in 
particular ways—one (will) as conjunctive or accumulative, the other (consent) as 
negative or subtractive.    
 
That the Vienna Convention speaks of consent rather than will is, in that sense, to 
draw attention to the general idea that treaties are primarily vehicles for the 
assumption of obligations or for the limitation of authority, rather than instruments 
that confer power and legal authority. This is reinforced, in part, by the occasional 
substitution of the word ‘consent’ by that of ‘assent’ (Article 36) and ‘acquiescence’ 
(Article 45(b)), both of which maintain the metaphorical stance of subordination, even 
if their purpose may be to signal the legal relevance of actions or omissions beyond 
the formalities laid down in Articles 11-15 for purposes of determining the validity of 
obligations in relations between different States.14 
 
Nevertheless, even if ‘consent’ carries with it a notion of subordination (with its 
associated metaphorical allusion to ‘bondage’), there are at least four different ways 
in which one may understand consent as plausibly extending, as opposed to merely 
limiting, authority. In the first place it may seen to be a function of the standard 																																																																																																																																																														
had moved towards the drafting of an expository code. See G.G. Fitzmaurice, (First) Report 
on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (1956) 105, p. 106 (paragraph 4_. 
 
14  Rosenne differentiates between the ‘comprehensive’ conception of consent 
(consent to be bound) that is associated with the performance of the formalities outlined in 
Arts. 11-15, and that which he calls ‘consent simpliciter’ that is found in Art. 9 (relating to the 
adoption of the text), Art. 22 (concerning objections to, or withdrawal of reservations), Arts. 
34, 36 and 37 (relating to the establishment, revocation or modification of rights of third 
states), Art. 54 (relating to termination or withdrawal) and Art. 57 (relating to suspension): 
supra n. 3, pp. 259-260.   
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synallagmatic correlation that has long been recognized in juridical thought15—in 
each case a State assumes an obligation under an international agreement, so also 
does it create certain rights for other parties to ensure the fulfillment of that obligation 
(the parameters of which, in case of breach, being determined by principles of State 
responsibility).16 In the second place, and beyond the rights of enforcement, it is not 
infrequently the case that treaties may endow a State with authority to take certain 
measures that would not otherwise be available to it (e.g. to allow the exercise of 
immigration powers in the territory of other States,17 or provide for the overflight of 
civilian or military aircraft)18. Both of these first two categories, however, operate 
within the standard framework of consent in the patrimonial sense of rights being 
‘transferred’ from one party to another under conditions of exchange.19 
 
In other cases, however, the conception that consent invariably involves the ‘conferral’ 
or ‘transfer’ of legal authority through the medium of an exchange is somewhat more 
difficult to sustain.  In the case of powers assumed by members of the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, for example, it is only with some difficulty 
that one might imagine such authority being ‘transferred’ from individual members of 																																																								
 
15 W.N. Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning’, Yale L.J., 23 (1913), 16-59. 
 
16 See, e.g., Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite: Belgium 
v. Senegal (Judgment) (2012) ICJ Rep. 422, p. 449. 
 
17 See e.g., 2007 Italy-Libya Bilateral Cooperation Agreement to Combat Clandestine 
Immigration, cited in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, European Court of Human Rights 
(Grand Chamber), Judgment, 23 Feb. 2012. 
 
18 See, e.g., 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 15 UNTS 295 
(which first establishes that ‘every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory’ (Art. 1) and then continues by establishing, under certain 
conditions, rights of entry and overflight). 
 
19 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: FRG/Denmark; FRG/Netherlands (Judgment), 
(1969) ICJ Rep, 3, pp. 25-26 (paragraph 28): ‘if … a State which, though entitled to do so, 
had not ratified or acceded, attempted to claim rights under the convention, on the basis of a 
declared willingness to be bound by it, or of conduct evincing acceptance of the conventional 
régime, it would simply be told that, not having become a party to the convention it could not 
claim any rights under it until the professed willingness and acceptance had been manifested 
in the prescribed form.’ For a critique of the contractual model as a way of understanding 
human rights agreements (and the proposal that they should be treated as straightforward 
‘pledges’), see L Brilmayer, ‘From “Contract” to “Pledge”: the Structure of International 
Human Rights Agreements’, BYbIL, 77 (2006), 163-202. 
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the United Nations given that no individual State possessed parallel authority prior to 
the creation of the United Nations.20 In a similar sense, treaties providing for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction (such as over pirates on the high seas)21 can only be 
squared with a patrimonial conception of exchange if one assumes from the outset 
that individual States possessed an intrinsic capacity to take such action.22 The rubric 
established in the Lotus Case, of course, was one that encouraged precisely this idea: 
that every conventional arrangement operated as a form of limit upon a legally-
protected privilege of sovereignty,23 so what was to be exchanged would always be 
part of a pre-existent legal ‘patrimony’, or authority, that inhered in the mere fact of a 
State’s existence. Yet even leaving aside the fact that this almost entirely obscured the 
conditions under which that background authority was to be produced or justified in 
the first place,24 it had the distinctly ideological function of allowing every novel 
claim to authority to assume the guise of a limitation. 
 
Finally, one may also note that by conspicuously agreeing not to do something there 
is a sense also in which States may, at the same time, be asserting for themselves the 
authority to do that act absent agreement otherwise. Thus, whilst the prohibition on 
torture or slavery found in treaties might seem to be directed towards the elimination 																																																								
20 It is true that Art. 24 (1) of the United Nations Charter speaks of member states 
‘conferring’ on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security and that in discharging its duties it ‘acts on their behalf’, but 
it is equally clear that this is intelligible only so far as it is framed as a collective endeavor 
operating within an institutional setting in which the UN has certain designated ‘functions’ or 
‘responsibilities’. It is notable that even those who support the contention that UN authority is 
premised upon its transfer from member states are forced to admit that this provides little 
basis for the assertion of ‘implied powers’. See D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and 
their Exercise of Sovereign Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
21 Art. 105 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 
UNTS 3. 
 
22 See, further, Allott, supra note 7, pp. 26-27. 
 
23 Lotus Case, PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10 (1927), p. 19: ‘Far from laying down a 
general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the applicability of their laws and 
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves 
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles 
which it regards as best and most suitable’.  
 
24 See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), pp. 94-96. 
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of an practice already regarded as illegal, the very conventional character of its 
prohibition is only such as to strengthen the argument that, absent the agreement itself, 
it would not be prohibited (or, at least, not prohibited in all circumstances). Of course, 
as was pointed out at some length in the Nicaragua Case,25 the argument is always 
available that the treaty in question merely ‘codifies’ customary international law, or 
causes it to ‘crystallize’.26 And this has certainly been the position adopted in the case 
of torture.27 But even so, all this does is to bring into prominence not merely the fact 
that processes of negotiation and contracting always take place against a background 
architecture of distributed legal authority (bargaining, as it is often said, in the 
‘shadow of the law’), but that the visibility of that background (or, perhaps, its status) 
may only become apparent through the medium of agreements that seek to ‘limit’ that 
self-same authority. The act of limiting, in other words, will often be characterized by 
a double movement: in one direction towards the assertion of an (historic) claim to 
authority or dispensation to act; in another towards the recognition of a will to 
subordinate that authority to law.28   
 
If this is to suggest that the formative place assumed by ‘consent’ in the law of 
treaties may in some ways disguise the operations of authority that are brought into 
play as a consequence of their purported ‘limitation’, that is all the more evident when 
one reflects upon its phenomenology. The language of consent invites us to think 
about the State, in organic terms, as a morally autonomous agent capable of pursuing 
‘the dictates of its own will’ and rationally promoting or defending its own ‘interests’ 
																																																								
 
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra n. 14, pp. 93-
97 (paragraphs 174-182). 
 
26 Ibid., pp. 94-95 (paragraph 177). 
 
27 See, e.g., Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra n. 
16, p. 457 (paragraph 99): ‘the prohibition of torture is part of customary international law 
and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens)’. The court added, however, ibid. at 
paragraph 100, that ‘the obligation to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of acts of torture 
under the Convention applies only to facts having occurred after its entry into force’.  In other 
words, whilst the prohibition on torture was customary, the obligation to criminalize was 
exclusively conventional. 
 
28  One may note the same structure being followed in case of the Chicago 
Convention: supra n. 18.  
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through the medium of international agreements.29 This idea, however, has always 
been mediated through a conception of formal agency—exemplified by the 
requirement that delegates possess ‘full powers’, that treaties be subject to 
‘ratification’, and by the insistence that the validity of treaty obligations is unaffected 
by the severance of diplomatic relations—in which the State is situated as a 
legitimating force behind the exercise of governmental authority, but never 
immediately there in its own right. The State never consents, one may say, only the 
agents of government acting on its behalf. Consent, in that sense, brings into play two 
different operations: in one direction it serves as a simplifying metaphor, bracketing 
the internal political struggles attendant to the definition of those interests, the 
formulation of State policy, or the capacity of the government to speak in the name of 
the State. In the other, however, it also operates as a way of giving visibility, or 
meaning, to the idea of the State itself—not merely as a pre-supposition of legitimate 
governmental activity, but as a ‘structural effect’ that is produced through, amongst 
other things, the treaty making activity undertaken in its name.30 
 
3. History 
It has been suggested, at least in the Anglo-American legal traditions, that the modern 
law of contract is fundamentally a creature of the nineteenth century, the time at 
which judges finally rejected the long-standing belief that the justification of 
contractual obligation was to be derived from the inherent fairness of an exchange, 
and substituted in its place the idea that the source of obligation was to be found in a 
convergence of the wills of the contacting parties.31 It was a shift, in other words, 
from a substantive evaluation of the contract in terms of justice and equity to an 
evaluation governed purely in terms of a ‘meeting of minds’. Behind this, of course, 
was an abandonment of a pre-physiocratic notion of the ‘just price’32 (or the idea that 																																																								
 
29 For an early statement, see, e.g., W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4th ed., 1895), p. 339. 
 
30 See T. Mitchell, ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their 
Critics’, Am. Pol. Sc. Rev., 85 (1991), 77-96. 
 
31 M.J. Horowicz, ‘The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law’, Harvard 
L.R., 87 (1974), 917-956 and D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 
(Cambridge, MA: Afar 1975, 1988). 
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there might be some external measure by which the content of an exchange might be 
evaluated) and a corresponding adhesion to the idea that the exercise of individual 
will through the medium of the contract constituted not only a vital expression of 
individual autonomy, but contributed also to the general social utility.33  It was only in 
the 19th Century, on this account, that consent, and consent alone, became the 
measure of contractual obligation - the story from there being that of the ensuing 
encroachment of social legislation upon the principle of contractual autonomy,34 and 
the displacement of a concern for actual intentions in favour of an attentiveness to the 
‘empirical’ character of the agreement that is produced.35 
 
The trajectory of treaty law partly follows, and partly departs from, this account.36  It 
is certainly clear that up until the nineteenth century, both humanist and scholastic 
teachings had encouraged the idea that the obligation to abide by treaties was a matter 
of individual virtue and good faith (pacta sunt servanda), and would be guided by 
principles of equity and justice (ex aequo et bono). Strict adherence to what was 
promised would not always be recommended, particularly if considerations of 
necessity or survival were at stake. In the same sense, however, it was recognized that 
the forms of equality that underpinned the validity of individual contracts (equality of 
knowledge, bargaining-power, and substance)37 were not uniformly evident in case of 																																																																																																																																																														
32 See, Etienne Bonnnot de Condillac, Commerce and Government (1776) (Trans 
Eltis, Edward Elgar, 1997) 
 
33 See M.R. Cohen, ‘The Basis of Contract’, Harvard L.R., 46 (1933), 553-592, at 
558-562. 
 
34 P.S Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979). 
 
35 O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, Harvard L.R., 10 (1897), Vol. 10, 457-468 
(‘no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some 
fundamental questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that 
the making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on 
the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the parties’ having meant the same thing 
but on their having said the same thing.’). 
 
36 See, generally, chapter of Lesaffer, at pp. ___-___ of this volume.  See, also, D.W. 
Bowett, ‘Review of Raftopoulos, Inadequacy of the Contractual Analogy in the Law of 
Treaties (1990)’, BYbIL, 64, (1993), 439- 
 
37 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (F.W. Kelsey trans., Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1925), Bk. II, Ch. xii, pp. 346-350. 
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treaties. Treaties, as Grotius was to explain, could be equal or unequal, could assume 
the form of an equivalent exchange or result in the diminution of sovereignty of the 
other party.38  Treaties of Peace were invariably at the forefront of analysis.39 If 
justice, equity and good faith were still the primary conditions, they did not 
automatically deny the validity of agreements substantially unequal in character— 
indeed, if anything, that was the exception.40 
 
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, treaties started to acquire the marks of 
an autonomous source of law, and as such emphasis was placed upon the meeting of 
minds, or upon the expression of a ‘mutual will’ through reciprocal consent to the 
terms of the agreement. This had several consequences. In the first place it became 
apparent that, since the value of an exchange had no external measure,41 it was 
impossible to determine in any abstract way what interest States might have in the 
bargain.  Thus, as de Martens was to maintain: 
The injury … that a nation may sustain from a treaty, is not a 
justifiable reason for such nation to refuse complying with its 
conditions.  It is the business of every nation to weigh and consult its 
own interests; and, as nothing hinders a nation from acquiring a right 
in its favour by a covenant with another, and it being impossible for 
any one to determine the degree of injury requisite to set a treaty aside, 
or to judge, in any obligatory manner, of the injury sustained, the 
security and welfare of all nations require, that an exception should 
																																																																																																																																																														
 
38 Ibid, pp. 394-397. 
 
39 See R. Lesaffer (ed.), Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: 
From the Late Middle Ages to World War One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
 
40 See E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (trans. C.G. 
Fenwick, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1916), Bk. II, Ch. 
xii, pp. 161 and 164.  Various exceptions were recognized, however: treaties ‘disastrous to the 
state’ are void (p. 161) as are treaties conflicting with the duty of the nation to itself (p. 164). 
 
41 See J.L. Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de L’Europe (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1819) 
p. 226 and de Martens, supra n. 10, pp. 168-169 and 185. One may relate this to Hume’s 
reformulation of the idea of ‘free will’ in which, he argued, it was to be construed as acting in 
accordance with one’s will as opposed to having the freedom to have acted otherwise. D. 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1739), pp. 399-412.  
Comment [1]: PLEASE	CONFIRM	IN	FN	
41	THAT	THE	DE	MARTENS	REFERENCE	
IS	INDEED	TO	FN	10	(1838	VOLUME)	
AND	NOT	(AS	YOU	HAD	IT)	TO	A	VOLUME	
FROM	1858.	
 13 
not be admitted which would sap the foundations of all treaties 
whatever.42 
Consent, thus, when mediated through the abstract idea of the ‘interest’ a state may 
have in coming to agreement with another,43 was incapable of being rationalized in 
any kind of material balance.  The equality of the agreement understood in terms of 
the value of what was exchanged—a material or substantive reciprocity—was 
excluded from the outset.44 
 
In the second place, if the abstract notion of a meeting of wills was to deny, in 
principle, any means of evaluating the equivalence of an exchange, it was 
nevertheless premised upon the idea that an exchange had indeed taken place. Yet this 
was by no means always obvious.  The Ottoman capitulations45 (and to a lesser extent, 
the regimes of consular jurisdiction in China and Japan 46 ) were particularly 
problematic in this respect. As one commentator was to observe, the word 
‘capitulation’ (letter of privilege) had historically been used to ‘indicate that these 
were not stipulations between two contracting parties, entered into for their reciprocal 
good, but only grants of privileges and immunities that the Porte made, out of its 
generosity, to the nations with whom it dealt.’47 That they appeared to represent 																																																								
 
42 G.F. von Martens, Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and 
Customs of the Modern Nations of Europe (trans. W. Cobbett, Philadelphia: Thomas Bradford, 
1795), ii, p. 52. 
 
43 For an account of the role of ‘interest’ in the thought of Kelsen, in particular, see M. 
Garcia-Salmones, The Project of Positivism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
 
44 See e.g., Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (1866) p. 44. 
 
45 E.A. Van Dyck, Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire (Washington DC: U.S. Govt. 
Printing Office, 1881); T. Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality 
in Japan, the Ottoman Empire and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
pp. 104-148. 
 
46  See, e.g., F.E. Hinckley, American Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient 
(Washington DC: W.H. Lowdermilk & Co., 1906); Kayaoglu, supra n. 45, at pp. 66-103 and 
149-190. 
47 Van Dyck, supra n. 45, at p. 24. See, also, U. Özsu, ‘Ottoman Empire’ in B. 
Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 429-448, at pp. 430-431 (‘For the Ottoman 
sultans … the capitulations were at root imperial decrees—unilaterally granted and 
unilaterally revocable pledges to non-Muslim sovereigns with which political alliances or 
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gratuitous concessions rather than reciprocal engagements, in fact, was subsequently 
taken by Turkey to be a ground to justify their unilateral denunciation (or, perhaps 
better, their ‘withdrawal’).48  The Turkish claim, here, was not unique. A similar 
argument had also been advanced by the Tsar of Russia who abolished the status of 
Batoum as a ‘free port’ (as so designated under Article 59 of the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878), on the basis that such a status was essentially a ‘privilege’ rather than an 
entitlement guaranteed as part of a contractual ‘exchange’.49  In both cases, however, 
the response was to deny the necessity of any substantive exchange for purposes of 
conditioning the opposability of the obligations: no unilateral right of denunciation 
thus existed outside the terms specified within the agreements themselves.50 This, of 
course, was to not deny the importance of reciprocity, but made clear that its content 
was a purely formal one: linking the obligations of one party, to rights of performance 
on the part of another.  
 
Lying behind the problem of substantive reciprocity, however, was a broader problem 
that concerned the effect of coercion upon the validity or otherwise of treaties—this 
being a problem, in particular, in the context of treaties of peace. In the first place, 
whilst jurists were increasingly concerned with emphasizing the importance of 
freedom of consent for purposes of establishing the validity of treaty obligations, they 
nevertheless continued to be swayed by Grotius’ intuition that since war could be held 
just on both sides, the absence of coercion was incapable of standing as an absolute 
condition of validity. De Martens, for example, came to the conclusion that ‘in default 
of a superior judge, and in default of a right to judge in their own cause’ violence 
must be treated as just, and hence cannot be opposed to the validity of a treaty unless 
its injustice is so manifest ‘as not to leave the least doubt’.51 In this context, jurists 																																																																																																																																																														
trading partnerships had been struck … These privileges were not to be confused with 
permanent rights. And the Ottoman State was not to be seen as engaged with a non-Muslim 
entity on terms of strict formal equality.’) 
 
48 See, generally, L.E. Thayer, ‘The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States’, AJIL, 17 (1923), 207-233, at 
224-225. 
 
49 A.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 498.   
 
50 See, generally, McNair, ibid., at pp. 498-499 and Thayer, supra n. 48, at pp. 225-
226. 
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were ultimately only able to maintain their commitment to consent by introducing 
into their accounts new ‘safety clauses’ or by subtly changing the content of consent 
itself.  In one direction, thus, jurists such as Pradier Fodéré were to seek to obviate the 
possibility of ‘consensual slavery’ by adducing, in emergency, a right of unilateral 
denunciation: 
 
Cases must necessarily be admitted in which the State must be able to 
declare itself freed from any engagement, even when it has not expressly 
reserved this right by a clause of the treaty.  Respect for engagements 
contracted should not, for example, be pushed to a suicidal extent.  
Though a State may be required to execute burdensome engagements 
contracted by it, it cannot be asked to sacrifice its development and its 
existence to the execution of the treaty.52 
 
The limits of consent, in other words, found their expression in the fundamental social 
conditions of a state’s existence.  It could not be used as an argument for suicide.53   																																																																																																																																																														
51 See, e.g., de Martens, supra n. 10, at p. 51. For a similar statement, see Hall, supra 
n. 29, at pp. 341-342. 
 
52 P.L.E. Pradier Fodéré, Traité de Droit International Public Européen et Américain 
(Vol. II) (Paris: Pedone, 1911), p. 264. See, also, Oppenheim who maintained that: 
 
When the existence or the vital development of a state stands in unavoidable 
conflict with its treaty obligations, the latter must give way, for self-
preservation and development, in accordance with the growth and the vital 
requirements of the nation, are the primary duties of every state.  
 
No state would consent to any such treaty as would hinder it in the fulfilment 
of these primary duties.  The consent of a state to a treaty presupposes a 
conviction that it is not fraught with danger to its existence and vital 
development.  For this reason every treaty implies a condition that if by an 
unforeseen change of circumstances an obligation stipulated in the treaty 
should imperil the existence or vital development of one of the parties, it 
should have a right to demand to be released from the obligation concerned.’ 
 
L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Vol. I) (4th ed., London: Longmans & 
Co., 1926) (A.D. McNair ed.), p. 748. 
53 Woolsey refers, in similar sense, to the non-binding character of treaties in which 
the government ‘flagitiously sacrifices the interests of the nation which it represents.  In this 
case the treacherous act of the government cannot be justly regarded as the act of the nation’. 
T.S. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1883), p. 168. 
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In a different direction, however, the value of autonomy to which consent appeared to 
give expression was often re-framed in social terms. Wheaton, for example, was to 
suggest that: 
 
By the general principles of private jurisprudence, recognised by most, if 
not all, civilised countries, a contract obtained by violence is void.  
Freedom of consent is essential to the validity of every agreement, and 
contracts obtained under duress are void, because the general welfare of 
society requires that they should be so.54 
While he was to insist, like many others, upon the importance of ‘freedom of consent’ 
to the validity of every agreement, Wheaton carefully reshapes, here, the justificatory 
discourse underpinning it: the virtue of consent lying less in the expression it gave to 
the idea of sovereign autonomy, than in what it appeared to contribute to the ‘general 
welfare’ of society. In socializing consent in this way, Wheaton was able to 
circumvent what otherwise appeared to be a fundamental tension between upholding 
the value of consent and but yet admitting the possibility of coercion or duress: 
 
On the other hand, the welfare of society requires that the engagements 
entered into by a nation under such duress as is implied by the defeat of 
its military forces, the distress of its people, and the occupation of its 
territories by an enemy, should be held binding; for if they were not, 
wars could only be terminated by the utter subjugation and ruin of the 
weaker party.55 
For Wheaton, then, the value of consent was to become subordinated to the more 
general social utility of maintaining the peace: the meaning and effect of any 
agreement being governed ultimately, not by resort to the principle of free consent, 
but by reference to the broader social purposes which the agreement appeared to 
advance.  																																																								
 
54 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 8th ed., 
1866) (R.H. Dana ed.), p. 340. 
 
55 Ibid. 
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Wheaton’s concern to bring to the forefront the social conditions upon which an 
agreement might be thought to rest was one widely shared, particularly in respect of 
peace agreements given their putative role in the preservation of ‘peace and good 
order’ or the ‘balance of power’.56 Yet, the more this tendency to ‘contextualise’ 
consent, or subordinate it to higher social imperatives, the more contingent its 
function was to become. It quickly became vulnerable, as a result, to arguments in 
favour of the termination of agreements when the circumstances upon which it was 
premised, appeared to change. The doctrine rebus sic stantibus would thus emerge as 
a plausible ground for denunciation of putatively permanent agreements even if, in 
practice, it was frequently resisted. As McNair notes, the doctrine was (inferentially) 
relied upon by Russia in its repudiation of the Black Sea clauses (Articles 11, 12 and 
13) of the 1856 Treaty of Paris57 and by Austria-Hungary following its annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1907.58  Whilst the 1871 London Protocol seemed to deny the 
possibility of fundamental change in its insistence upon the ‘sanctity of treaties’ and 
the requirement that treaty engagements might only be terminated with the consent of 
other parties,59 this was not to prevent it becoming a durable theme acquiring more 
specificity in the course of the twentieth century. 																																																								
 
56 Ibid, at p. 39. In similar vein, see A. Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens (Vol. II) 
(Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1896), pp. 35-36. 
 
57 McNair, supra n. 49, at pp. 494-497 and 682. 
 
58 The annexation was inconsistent with Art. 25 of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, 153 
CTS 171, in which European Powers had agreed to the occupation and administration of the 
Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. 
 
59 The 1871 London Protocol, provided that: 
 
It is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate 
itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, 
unless with the consent of the Contracting Parties by means of an amicable 
arrangement’.  
 
See D.J. Bederman, ‘The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a 
Primitivist View of the Law of Nations’, AJIL, 82 (1988), 1-40, at 15; G. Distefano, 
‘Le Protocole de Londres du 17 Janvier 1871: Miroir du Droit International’, J. Hist. 
Int’l L., 6 (2004), 79-142 and L.H. Woolsey, ‘The Unilateral Termination of Treaties’, 
AJIL, 20 (1926), 346-353, at 349 (‘This declaration … would seem to amount to no 
more than a declaration that a treaty cannot be annulled by one of the parties without 
the consent of the other in circumstances which involve no change in the fundamental 
Comment [2]: PLEASE	PROVIDE	
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At the end of the nineteenth century thus, one was to find a conception of treaty law 
that was built, by analogy, upon the idea of individual consent to contractual 
obligation, but in which two movements were perceptible. In one direction it was to 
become increasingly formal in the sense that it was emptied of any substantive 
evaluation of exchange and in which the condition of mutuality was sustained only so 
far as signature or ratification was required. In another direction, however, it was also 
to become increasingly ‘social’ in the sense that the validity and effect of consent was 
ever more closely linked to the political context in which it was located. No one, it 
seems, was willing to treat the absence of coercion as an absolute condition of validity.  
But at the same time no one was to rule out the possibility of denunciation if the 
‘political circumstances’ so required.   
 
On the face of it, these might appear to have been entirely contradictory tendencies.  
The more attention given to the social and political setting in which treaties were 
located, the more it might seem that the content of treaties would have to become 
central to an evaluation of their validity. Consent could surely not be made both more 
formal and more social simultaneously? Yet one may also understand these 
movements to be entirely consonant with one another: to produce the idea of 
autonomous consent as a consistent marker of treaty validity required the removal of 
its social or material content. And this was achieved not by its total elimination, but 
by shifting it from the inside to the outside—it was to become the ‘context’ within 
which the exchange was to take place rather than something that impinged upon the 
question whether consent itself had been given. A purely juridical conception of 
consent, in other words, was to be produced through the simultaneous construction of 
an autonomous external ‘political’ or ‘social’ environment within which it was 
embedded.  The formalization of consent, in other words, was intimately related to its 
embedding in a social environment. 
 
4.  The Conditions of Effective Consent 
At the beginning of this modern period, as de Martens was to suggest, five things 
appeared ‘necessarily supposed’ for a treaty to be obligatory: ‘1. that the parties have 																																																																																																																																																														
conditions on which the treaty is based and which show no violation of the treaty by 
the other party.’) 
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power to consent; 2. that they have consented; 3. that they have consented freely; 4. 
that the consent is mutual; and 5. that the execution is possible.’60 All five of these 
‘conditions of authenticity’ continue to be reflected in one form or another in the 
Vienna Convention.  The question of authority to consent is addressed in Articles 6-8 
of the Vienna Convention61 dealing with the initial question of capacity, the validation 
of full powers, and the subsequent ‘adoption’ of unauthorized agreements 
(sponsions).62  The fact of consent—or rather the process by which consent might be 
evidenced—is addressed in Articles 11-15 dealing with signature, ratification, 
exchange of instruments, acceptance, approval and accession, supplemented by the 
provisions in Articles 34-38 governing the means by which third states may ‘assume’ 
rights or obligations in relation to an agreement to which (by definition) they are not 
party.63 The question of freedom of consent understood as ‘the absence of coercion’ is 
addressed in Articles 51 and 52.  Of relevance, here, however are also the questions of 
error (Article 48), fraud (Article 49) and corruption Article 50) which seek to engage 
with the conditions of knowledge and communication under which consent may be 
discerned to be fully free.  Mutuality of consent is ensured through provisions relating 
to entry into force and termination following breach, and the final condition relating 
to execution finds expression in Article 61 governing supervening impossibility of 
performance.  
 
If one takes the Vienna Convention, broadly speaking, as an attempt to institute a 
regime of law directed towards enabling, or facilitating, a system of ‘mutual self-rule’ 
through free consent, the most problematic features would seem to be those that 
appear to describe its limits—that dispense with consent, militate against it being 
‘free’, or condition its effects by reference to the social or political environment.  
Each provides a slightly different account of the phenomenon called ‘consent’ that is 
being ushered into existence. 																																																								
 
60 De Martens, Vol. II, supra n. 10, at p. 48. 
 
61 See, also, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon 
and Nigeria: Cameroon v. Nigeria (Judgment) (2002) ICJ Rep. 303, at p. 430 (paragraph 265). 
 
62 See, also, Art. 47 VCLT. 
 
63  See, further, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra n. 19, at pp. 25-26 
(paragraphs 27-28). 
 20 
 
4.1. The Necessity of Consent 
The Vienna Convention is overtly rigorous about the necessity of consent for 
purposes of the assumption of obligations under treaty.  Whilst it makes no claims as 
to the broader significance of consent in relation to customary international law, so far 
as treaties are concerned obligation follows consent (rather than the other way 
round).64 Yet the Convention clearly also provides certain stipulations that describe 
what meaning is be attributed to consent.  A simple example here is the move initiated 
by Lauterpacht amongst others away from the ‘principle’ of unanimous consent in the 
context of multilateral agreements. In admitting that there was no right of 
‘accession’,65 he was to encourage the view that if a multilateral agreement provided 
for the possibility of accession, the formal act of consent also implied tacit consent to 
the participation of any other party that subsequently undertakes the requisite 
formalities.  No additional act of ‘consent’ should be required unless specified by the 
terms of the agreement.66  Of course, in a sense, this goes to the content of consent 
itself, and it is obviously arguable that if the treaty allows for the participation of 
other states, consent to the agreement also necessarily implies, consent to the 
participation by all, or any, other states. But it is equally clear that in setting such 
matters out in general provisions, a formalized distance is thus erected between actual 
and imputed intentions: tacit consent being less concerned with the actual content of 
the original agreement (as might be discerned, for example, through expressed 
intentions), than with the imputation of certain rational intentions to the author. 
 
																																																								
 
64 See, here, International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion) (1950) ICJ 
Rep. 128, at p. 139 (an obligation to conclude an agreement is a contradiction in terms:  ‘[a]n 
“agreement” implies consent of the parties concerned … The parties must be free to accept or 
reject the terms of the contemplated agreement. No party can impose its terms on the other 
party.’) 
 
65 See, e.g., Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia: 
Germnay v. Poland (Merits) (1926) PCIJ Ser. A, Judgment No. 7, 19, at pp. 28-29. 
 
66 See, e.g., Art. 4 of 1899 Hague Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War and Its Annex, 187 CTS 429 and Art. 6 of 1907 Hague Convention (IV) 
With Respect to Laws and Customs of War on Land, 205 CTS 277. See, also, Art. 10 of 1949 
North Atlantic Treaty, 243 UNTS 34 (accession by invitation). 
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This kind of regulatory architecture is carried throughout the Vienna Convention: 
interpretation is not governed by the actual intentions of the authors, but by the 
‘ordinary meaning’ that may be given to its terms (although the travaux preparatoires 
may be resorted to as a supplementary means of interpretation);67 error may vitiate 
consent only if it formed an essential basis for participation and was not otherwise a 
consequence of the negligence of the party concerned (Article 48); fraud is relevant 
only so far as it may be evidenced and attributed to another negotiating party (Article 
49).  That the Convention regulates consent in this way is wholly unsurprising in the 
sense that were it not to do so, the principle of pacta sunt servanda would be virtually 
emptied of content by a practice of self-judgment.  But the point that consent, here, is 
separated from the putatively psychological conditions of intentionality and motive,68 
or that states may be treated as having consented even in circumstances in which they 
might think they have not, is nevertheless revealing: the concern being not so much as 
to mirror social life, as to provide an idealized account of it. 
 
Even if the Vienna Convention is largely structured around the operationalisation of 
the idea of consent, there are several circumstances in which the necessity of consent 
is attenuated.  Reservations do not always require acceptance by other parties,69 rights 
in favour of third parties might be established or withdrawn without express 
consent,70 two or more parties may ‘modify’ the terms of the agreement inter se 
without the consent of other parties.71 The one field in which the necessity of consent 
																																																								
 
67 Art. 31. Reuter comments, in this regard, that ‘law cannot take into consideration 
anything that remains buried away in the minds of the parties’. ‘Will’ he suggests must be 
‘spelled out’: P. Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (Geneva: Geneva Institute of 
International Studies, 2nd ed., 1995), p. 30. 
 
68 Fitzmaurice comments, in this vein, that a treaty is both a text and a legal 
transaction. ‘In the latter sense, the treaty evidences but does not constitute the agreement’. 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, First Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (1956) 105, 
p. 110. 
 
69 See Arts. 19-23 VCLT. 
 
70 Arts. 36 and 37 VCLT. 
 
71 On the assumption that their own rights and obligations are not impaired as a 
consequence: Art. 41 VCLT. 
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is most problematic, however, is that which was explicitly left outside the terms of the 
1969 Vienna Convention—state succession.72  
 
On the face of it, the term succession implies a regulated process by which rights and 
obligations assumed by one legal person are ‘inherited’ by another. In the context of 
treaty law, thus, it brings to mind a process by which a ‘successor’ might assume such 
rights and obligations as might arise from a treaty signed and/or ratified by its historic 
forbear as a consequence of the operation of certain general rules, as opposed to 
through the medium of a separate act of consent. To use the terminology of the 1978 
Vienna Convention, the successor may be seen to ‘replace’ the ‘predecessor’ state in 
its responsibility for treaty relations of a specified territory—stepping into its legal 
shoes, so to speak, by reason of rules of inheritance rather than by act of will. 
 
Behind this superficial gloss are two very different ideas. The first relates to the tacit 
or implied effects of the original act of consent. It is ordinarily imagined that if a 
government ratifies an international agreement, it (or rather the ‘State’) will continue 
to be bound by that agreement for the future until such a juncture as the treaty ceases 
to have effect in accordance with the terms of the agreement or under the terms of 
general international law. Such consent, it is supposed, is not to be vitiated by 
incidental changes in the local environment such as a change in government, or a 
change in the identity of those responsible for concluding international agreements.73  
Only, as far as the Vienna Convention is concerned, would a ‘fundamental change of 
circumstances’ warrant the termination of the agreement (which of course implies the 
continuity of the agreement until the moment at which that idea is invoked).  Seen in 
such terms, a succession of states (whether through separation or unification) would 
not affect the binding character of treaty obligations insofar as the ‘successor’ could 
simply be treated as inheriting the obligations of the predecessor, much like a new 
government would inherit the obligations of the old. No additional act of consent 
would be needed and all treaties would continue, so far as possible, in the adjusted 																																																								
 
72 See Art. 73 VCLT (‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge 
any question that may arise in relation to a treaty from a succession of States’). 
 
73  See G.G. Fitzmaurice, Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN4/120 (1959) p. 43. 
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social environment.74  In this account the analytic by which succession is to be 
conceptualized is one that pays attention to the question of identity: the successor 
state is the predecessor state for purposes of performing its international obligations. 
 
The second, and contrasting idea, is that succession denotes the acceptance or 
imposition of treaty obligations assumed by one party, upon what is, to all intents and 
purposes, a third party to the original agreement. The term ‘succession’ being 
indicative merely of the historic social and political connections that bind the 
predecessor and successor states together (the fact, for example, that both exercised 
jurisdiction over the same space at different moments in time) and to the fact that, in 
some instances at least, treaty obligations in question might already have been applied 
or executed on the territory of the successor.  In this form, the regulatory architecture 
of succession would seek to operationalise the transfer, or assignment, of obligations 
from one party to another, but in which case consent of both the successor state, and 
other states parties would presumably be necessary.75 
 
As if attempting to respond to the problem of identity (sameness/difference) that 
segments these two conceptions of succession, the 1978 Vienna Convention cuts 
through the divergence in two different ways. In the first place, it posits a typology of 
social and political organization that differentiates between different kinds of political 
change along two lines: between, on the one hand, aggregative processes of 
unification or federation, and dis-aggregative processes of dissolution and secession 
(with ‘cession’ as a hybrid); and, on the other, between processes that result in the 
formation of ‘newly independent states’, and those that do not.  Here, a spatial 
analytics of expansion and contraction is overlaid by a more fundamental 
differentiation that conditions the effects of any change upon the identification of 
states as ‘new’ or ‘old’. A presumption in favour of treaty continuity operates in case 
of ‘old’, but not ‘new’ states. In the second place, this organizational frame is then 
qualified by a further functional typology by which different kinds of treaty are 																																																								
 
74 See, e.g., D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law 
(Vol. II) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 88-89. 
 
75 See McNair, supra n. 49, at p. 601; G.G. Fitzmaurice, Fifth Report on the Law of 
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/130 (1960) p. 94. 
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regarded as having different effects: bilateral treaties do not always survive, territorial 
and boundary treaties (or their ‘regimes’) generally do.76 Succession to constituent 
instruments depends upon the ‘rules of the organisation’ concerned (Article 4) and 
hence subject to the political and diplomatic processes governing admission. 
 
The complex analytics put in play here has much to tell us about the imputed 
character of consent in case of treaties. In the first place, it forefronts one of the most 
self-evidential, but also most elusive, aspects of the question of consent: who is it who 
might be said to be consenting and on whose behalf?  In normal circumstances, the 
answer to both elements is usually a simple one: the ‘state’. But it is equally clear, as 
has already been pointed out, the state itself never consents in and of its own right, but 
only through the medium of its representatives or agents. And it is here that the 
problem of succession arises—how, if that is the basis for consent, does it survive the 
reconfiguration of that relationship of authority? What conditions of political 
legitimacy are necessary for consent to have the effects prescribed? The general 
intuition, as Reuter observed, was that: 
 
when the personality of the new State expresses a genuine and autonomous 
social reality, commitments are not transmitted, but when it has in fact had 
a part in the formation of its predecessor’s commitments there is a 
substantial continuity and commitments are transmitted to the successor 
State.77 
 
Yet as the ILC ultimately appreciated, the kind of judgment required for sustaining 
this distinction could never satisfactorily be elaborated without drifting into 
arbitrariness (what level of participation is required? what indices determine genuine, 
as opposed to fictional, autonomy?). The final formula adopted for the Convention— 
that ‘new states’ were effectively those that enjoyed a right to self-determination— 
really just deferred the question.  
 																																																								
 
76 Arts. 11 and 12 VCLT. See, further, Case Concerning Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Rep. 7, at pp. 71-72. 
 
77 Reuter, supra n. 67, at p. 113. 
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In the second place, if the questions of political legitimacy and participation were to 
haunt the evaluation of whether treaties, in general, should continue, the Vienna 
Convention was to soften its implications in two different ways.  On the one hand, 
new states were not entirely cast adrift, but enjoyed according to the ILC’s 
controversial formula, a ‘right of option’—a right to notify, by unilateral act, their 
succession to multilateral agreements under conditions not entirely dissimilar to that 
of accession (in the sense that new reservations might be made, and its effect is to 
constitute the state a party from the date of notification)78 but yet outside the process 
for accession that may otherwise be laid down in the agreement itself. ‘New states’ in 
that sense, were never entirely ‘new’.79 On the other hand, ‘territorial’ and ‘boundary’ 
regimes automatically continued irrespective of the political conditions underpinning 
the original expression of consent. The rationale for such regimes continuing to 
subsist despite the (potential) defects in consent was, at once, performative and 
constitutive.  In the first instance they were understood to be regimes whose validity 
was seen to stem from the fact of their materialization. They were no longer simply 
‘agreements’ contingent for their validity upon consent, but were the products of their 
execution: regimes that had imprinted themselves on the territory creating rights and 
obligations erga omnes.80 In the second place, their indelible character, furthermore, 
stemmed not merely from the fact that they gave permanence, and security, to the 
‘new’ State—placing its borders beyond the field of political contestation—but from 
the fact that they also supplied its essential pre-conditions. The border, as Balibar 
succinctly put it, constituted one of the ‘nondemocratic conditions of democracy’.81. 
 
																																																								
 
78 Articles 17-23, VCRSST. 
 
79 On the ‘legal nexus’ see M. Craven, The Decolonisation of International Law: 
State Succession and the Law of Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 141-
147. 
 
80 See Case Concerning Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra n. 76, at pp. 71-72 
(paragraph 123) (the treaty ‘inescapably created a situation in which the interests of other 
users of the Danube were affected’). See the chapter of Michael Waibel in this volume, at pp. 
___- 
 
81 É. Balibar, We the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 109. 
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In case of succession, thus, two implicit conditions of consent are laid bare, and 
whose appearance in case of ‘crisis’ is only to highlight their absence otherwise.  On 
one side, it would seem to demand a level of authenticity—demand that consent itself 
be rooted in a genuine, popular, social consciousness; that it be neither repressive nor 
authoritarian. On the other side, and in order for it to bear this democratic overtone, 
consent is dependent upon the spatial pre-configuration of the ‘demos’ in relation to 
which there is no possibility of collective agency: no consent could be given to that 
which made consent possible. If revolution has the habit of exposing the unspoken 
preconditions of political rule, the problem of succession does the same for treaties—
they rely upon the idea of a positive, affirmative, social consensus underpinning the 
acts of governmental agencies (and by reference to which it may be measured), but 
yet are conditioned upon the impossibility of any such social consensus grounding 
itself (in the sense that some prior determination of its conditions is required).82   
 
4.2. Freedom of Consent 
Whilst succession poses the problem as to who may, or may not, have consented, the 
problem of coercion goes more directly to the question of its content.  The legal 
regulation of the use of force in the twentieth century, as Lauterpacht was to suggest, 
was central to ‘the restoration of the missing link of analogy of contracts and treaties, 
i.e. of the freedom of will as a requirement for the validity of treaties’.83 The earlier 
position, as he was to explain, rendered any such equation problematic: 
 
[Since] war was permitted as an institution, it followed that the law 
was bound to recognize the results of successful use of force thus 
used. To this explanation, unimpeachable in logic, of the legal 
position there was added the cogent consideration that the adoption 
of a different rule would have removed the legal basis of all treaties 
imposed by the victor upon the defeated state and thus perpetuated 
indefinitely a state of war. While the persuasive power of these 
considerations could not be denied, it was clear that the disregard of 																																																								
82 E. Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 1-19. 
 
83 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1927), p. 166. 
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the vitiating force of duress in the conclusion of treaties tended to 
constitute, in a real sense, a denial of the legal nature of treaties 
conceived as agreements based on the free will of the contracting 
parties.84 
 
It was thus only by removing the possibility that war could be resorted to as a legal 
remedy that it could be established that ‘a treaty imposed by or as a result of force or 
threats of force resorted to in violation of the principles of these instruments of a 
fundamental character is invalid by virtue of the operation of the general principle of 
law which postulates freedom of consent as an essential condition of the validly of 
consensual undertakings’.85 Whilst jurists had been clearly reluctant to perfect this 
move in the inter-war years (particularly insofar as the terms of the Treaty of 
Versailles itself would have been called into question),86 Lauterpacht’s intuitions were 
subsequently endorsed in the form of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention which 
renders void any treaty procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of the United Nations Charter.87   
 
In his discussion of the question at the ILC, however, Lauterpacht was to draw 
attention to the significance of the final phraseology of what was to become Article 
52.  Inclusion of the phrase ‘in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United 																																																								
84 H. Lauterpacht, First Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63, p. 147. 
 
85 Ibid., p. 148 (paragraph 3). 
 
86 See, e.g., J.L. Kunz, ‘The Meaning and Scope of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda’, 
AJIL, 39 (1945), 180-197, at 185 and McNair, supra n. 49, at pp. 139-140. Such a position 
was also apparently upheld by Fitzmaurice in his reports to the ILC concerning the effect of 
duress, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958) 20, at p. 26. But 
see Art. 4 (3) of the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of 
Aggression, AJIL Supp., 33 (1939), 819-909, at 895 (‘A treaty brought about by an 
aggressor’s use of armed force is voidable’). Concern over the Munich Agreement was 
clearly a considerable spur in this regards: see, e.g., Q. Wright, ‘The Munich Settlement and 
International Law’, AJIL, 33 (1939), 12-32, at 22-23 (arguing that the authors of the Munich 
Settlement had erred in the same way as had those of the Versailles agreement, in placing 
substance before procedure). 
 
87 Cf. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case: Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland (1973) 
ICJ Rep. 14, at p. 59 (‘There can be little doubt, as is implied in the Charter of the United 
Nations and recognized in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that 
under contemporary international law an agreement concluded under the threat or use of force 
is void’). 
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Nations’ was to draw attention to the fact that the problem of duress was to be 
situated within the framework of Charter principles governing coercion. As the 
Charter only prohibited the ‘unlawful threat and use of force’,88 and hence left open 
the possibility of defensive violence, force authorised by the Council itself,89 and the 
use of coercion falling short of ‘armed force’ itself90—the problem of duress, or 
palpable lack of consent, was obviously to re-appear. For Lauterpacht, the response 
was to be found in a differentiation between forms of coercion: 
 
Force ceases to have the character of mere coercion if it is exercised 
in execution of the law—as a legal sanction—or in accordance with 
the law. Although in such cases the element of consent on the part of 
the State concerned is lacking, the impersonal authority of the law 
on behalf of which—and in accordance with which force is 
employed is properly deemed to supply, or to remedy, the absent 
element of consent.91 
																																																								
 
88 Schmitt remarks that ‘to demand of a politically united people that it wage war for 
a just cause only is either something self-evident, if it means that war can be risked only 
against a real enemy, or it is a hidden political aspiration of some other party to wrest from 
the state its jus belli and to find norms of justice whose content and application in the 
concrete case is not decided upon by the State but by another party, and thereby it determines 
who the enemy is.’ See C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
1996), p. 49. He continues (at pp. 50-1) by remarking that the Kellogg Briand Pact ‘neither 
repudiated war as an instrument of international politics… nor condemned nor outlawed war 
altogether’. This, he reasoned followed from the fact that the declaration was subject to the 
specific exception of self-defence which, far from being a mere exception, gave the norm its 
concrete content—it was for each State to determine for itself the justification in question.  He 
concluded, in that respect that ‘the solemn declaration of outlawing war does not abolish the 
friend-enemy distinction, but, on the contrary, opens new possibilities by giving an 
international hostis declaration new content and new vigour’.  Thus (on p. 56) he concludes, 
‘the Geneva League of Nations does not eliminate the possibility of wars, just as it does not 
abolish states.  It introduces new possibilities for wars to take place, sanctions coalition wars, 
and by legitimizing and sanctioning certain wars it sweeps away many obstacles to war.’ 
 
89 Cf. Commentary to Arts. 49 and 70 VCLT, Yrbk. ILC, 1966, Vol. II, pp. 246-247, 
268. 
 
90 On economic coercion see, Declaration on the prohibition of military, political and 
economic coercion in the conclusion of treaties, annexed to the Final Act of the Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/26.  An account of proceedings 
leading to the declaration may be found in C. Murphy, ‘Economic Duress and Unequal 
Treaties’, Virginia JIL, 11 (1970), 51-69. 
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Lauterpacht’s intention here seems to be to try to do two things.  In the first place, and 
most obviously, he seems to want to distinguish the existence of coercion preliminary 
to the conclusion of an agreement from the identification of ‘duress’ as a feature that 
nullifies the effect of such an agreement. Only if the former is treated as ‘unlawful’ 
(‘mere coercion’) would the issue of duress come to be entertained.92  And that would 
be the case even if there were no doubt as to the significance of the coercion in 
procuring the consent of the subordinate party.  In the second place, he also wants to 
assign to the ‘impersonal character of the law’ a remedial capacity—a capacity to 
affirm the validity of consent ‘as if’ it had been freely given. ‘Freedom of consent’, in 
other words, is to be re-shaped: gone is any sense that it corresponds to a free exercise 
of will. Rather it assumes the character of a mere formal ‘absence of constraint 
exercised otherwise than by law’.93   
 
There are three particular consequences that seem to flow from this.  The first is that 
the requirement that consent be ‘free’ is thereby largely conditioned by the extent to 
which the actions of the party exercising coercion are regarded as lawful or 
unlawful.94 The focus is therefore shifted entirely away from the quality of consent 
exercised by the party experiencing duress: coerced consent may still be consent.  In 
the second place, it offers an analytic in which coercion and consent are entirely 
separable—in which the presence or absence of unlawful coercion becomes, in a 
sense, an ex post facto qualification on the effect of consent. Unlawful coercion is 																																																																																																																																																														
91 H. Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/63, (1953) p. 150 
(paragraph 9). Brierly makes a similar point (supra n. 9, at p. 319): ‘The true anomaly in the 
present law is not that it should be legal to coerce a state into accepting obligations which it 
does not like, but that it should be legal for a state which has been victorious in a war to do 
the coercing; and the change to which we ought to look forward is not the elimination of the 
use of coercion from the transaction, but the establishment of international machinery to 
ensure that when coercion is used it shall be in a proper case and by due process of law, and 
not, as present it may be, arbitrarily.’ 
 
92 It is interesting to note the contrast between Art. 52 VCLT which qualifies coercion 
of the ‘State’ in this way to the unqualified terms of Art. 51 so far as concerns the coercion of 
a ‘representative of the State’. 
 
93 Lauterpacht, supra n. 91 (paragraph 6). 
 
94 Under Art. 75 VCLT, provisions of the VCLT ‘are without prejudice to any 
obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor state in consequence of 
measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that 
State’s aggression’. 
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something that has to be established as a way of impugning an agreement whose 
initial validity is the starting point. As the ICJ was to insist in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case, any ‘accusation’ of coercion for purposes of disputing the validity 
of an agreement had to be accompanied by ‘clear evidence’ that went above and 
beyond, in that case, the mere presence of naval forces off the coast of the State 
concerned.95 In the third place, and fairly obviously, in conflating ‘duress’ with the 
more general conditions that delimit unlawful threats and use of force, a whole host of 
other forms of economic and political pressure are immediate put beyond its reach. 
 
If coercion and duress are separated in this way, however, the original argument that 
the prohibition of duress was essential for purposes of perfecting the analogy between 
the treaty and the contract by ensuring autonomous consent as a constitutive feature of 
treaty obligations was to become that much harder to maintain.96  To the extent that 
coercion is rendered largely compatible with consent, the problem would no longer 
seem to be a problem of treaty law, but rather, as Brierly suggests, ‘a particular aspect 
of that much wider problem which pervades the whole system, that of subordinating 
the use of force to law.’97 This idea is taken up by Sinclair who, in his analysis of the 
Vienna Convention, suggests that: 
 
coercion of a State by the threat or use of force does not, strictly 
speaking, vitiate consent; it rather involves the commission of an 
international delict with all the sanctions attached thereto.98 
 
																																																								
95 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra n. 87, at p. 14 (paragraph 24). 
 
96 Caflisch remarks that ‘[a]n imbalance of treaty obligations might carry a conclusive 
presumption or at least the suggestion that a party, on account of its political or economic 
dependence from its partner(s), did not enter into the treaty out of its own free will, for no 
‘reasonable State’ can be assumed to have concluded an agreement disadvantageous to it.’ 
See L. Caflisch, ‘Unequal Treaties’, German YbIL, 35 (1992), 52-80, at 53). This supposition 
is later rejected by the author as unfounded. 
 
97 Brierly, supra n. 9, at p. 319. 
 
98 Sinclair, supra n. 13, at p. 180. See, also, Reuter, supra n. 67, at pp. 180-181 
(‘Invalidity can … hardly be regarded as a result of vitiated consent; it is rather a sanction of 
an international offence.’) 
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In a positive sense, Sinclair seems to draw upon the point made by Lauterpacht to the 
effect that the nullification of an agreement following an unlawful act could, in some 
senses, be regarded as analogous to an obligation not to recognise an unlawful 
situation.99  Whilst for Lauterpacht this was a crucial move in his articulation of the 
emergent prohibition on duress, for Sinclair it clearly works in a different direction.  
Having discussed the perils of giving heed to the idea of economic duress,100 he goes 
on to suggest that ‘consent’ needed to be stripped of its associations with a factual 
‘absence of coercion’ as Lauterpacht had suggested.  Consent, rather, should be 
associated merely with the formal mode of acceptance of an instrument – signified by 
signature, ratification or accession – in which any investigation of the content of 
‘agreement’ was beyond the domain of law, and the presence or absence of duress 
largely irrelevant.101  Duress, for Sinclair, thus operates as an independent variable 
that may (or may not) render an agreement invalid ‘by operation of law’, rather than 
something that goes to an evaluation as to whether or not there has been an agreement 
in the first place.102 He shares, in that sense, the view of Fitzmaurice who, when 
proposing the distinction between formal and essential validity, was to suggest that 
the determination as to what is an agreement under international law is ultimately 
separable from (and in some ways, prior to) the question as to whether or not it is a 
nullity.103 																																																								
 
99 See, also, I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 404-405 (‘State practice in regard to the effect of duress is in part 
connected with the development of the principle of non-recognition of territorial acquisitions 
obtained by the threat or use of force.’) 
 
100 Sinclair, supra n. 13, at p. 178. 
 
101 See, e.g., Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State, 30 June 1921, 
in which it was noted, in reference to German signature of the Treaty of Versailles, that ‘even 
though a vanquished nation is in effect compelled to sign a treaty, I think that in 
contemplation of law its signature is regarded as voluntary’. Cited in G.H. Hackworth, Digest 
of International Law (Vol. V) (Washington DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1940), p. 158. 
 
102 This point is taken up by Nahlik who notes that Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special 
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission for the law of treaties, ‘chose to speak about 
invalidity only, with hardly anything stated about validity of treaties’. This ‘negative’ 
approach to the issue necessarily placed ‘a presumption in favour of the validity and binding 
force of treaties.  A treaty, any treaty, is presumed to be valid and in force unless one of the 
grounds listed in the convention has occurred.’  S.E. Nahlik, ‘The Grounds of Invalidity and 
Termination of Treaties’, AJIL, 65 (1971), 736-756, at 738 and 739-740. 
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What seems to be revealed here is at least three different ways of thinking about 
consent and its place in the law of treaties. The first formulation, is that of an exercise 
of free will whose essential conditions are to be determined by the presence or 
absence of coercion (and perhaps including also the absence of mistake, error or 
fraud), but whose field of operation, it is reasoned, must necessarily be limited in 
view of the social desirability of certain forms of coerced agreements (peace treaties).  
The second is a formalised version of the first in which consent is conceptualized as 
contingent upon a distinction being made between lawful and unlawful coercion.  
‘Free will’ here is not the free will of a radically autonomous agent, but a legally 
regulated freedom the parameters of which are dependent upon the general constraints 
imposed by international law upon the use of force or other forms of coercion, and in 
which consent is ‘presumed’, or its absence ‘remedied’, in cases in which coercion is 
lawful. The third is entirely procedural and in which consent is conceived, as 
Fitzmaurice puts it, as merely ‘a method … by which obligations arise or come into 
force’, but which is yet independent of the binding force of the obligations once in 
place. Duress, so far as it attends to the problem of substantive validity, is entirely 
separable from the process of offering consent (through signature, ratification 
accession etc.).   
 
For all their differences, all three of these accounts seek to do the same thing: to 
provide different ways of keeping the ideas of consent and coercion apart.  Only by 
insulating the idea of consent in some way from the possibility of an entirely routine 
form of coercion can it survive as a means of providing the grounds for obligation.  
And this, in a sense, is encapsulated in Sinclair’s fear that ‘[a]cceptance of the 
concept that economic pressure could operate to render a treaty null and void would ... 
put at risk any treaty concluded between a developing and a developed country’.104  
As a consequence, thus, one finds coercion itself being re-configured along a dynamic 
that excludes from view a range of forms of economic and non-armed coercion (as 
well, of course, as legitimate armed coercion), and consent being re-configured into 																																																																																																																																																														
103 G.G. Fitzmaurice, Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (1956) 
109. 
 
104 Sinclair, supra n. 13, at p. 178. 
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an entirely formal, or procedural, idea separated from the social conditions that may 
impinge upon its substantive content.   
 
5. The Limits of Consent 
If, thus far, I have been dealing with the problem of the affirmation of free will 
through its denial, there is also the related issue of its limitation—of the 
circumstances in which consent is not denied, or rendered dispensable, but when 
consent is understood to encounter certain limits upon its effect. There are two 
possible categories here, both of which are essentially ‘contextual’ or 
‘environmental’: on the one hand there are normative limits which putatively restrict 
the capacity of States to enter into agreements that violate some other, more 
fundamental, principle of international law (jus cogens);105 on the other hand there are 
factual limits which circumscribe the effect of obligations by reference to some 
evaluation of the social conditions under which the obligations are to be put into 
operation. To the extent that the former is concerned with relationship between formal 
acts of consent and the extant legal environment that might putatively govern their 
effect, I have already covered much of the ground above in dealing with the question 
of coercion.106  What I have not addressed is the putative relationship that might exist 
between the act of consent and its social, political or economic environment.  
 
Within the Vienna Convention, two principles are given prominence here—one being 
the principle of supervening impossibility of performance;107 the other, the principle 
of fundamental change of circumstances.108 Both share an analytic109 which seeks to 																																																								
105 Arts. 53 and 64 VCLT. 
 
106 Reference, here, may also be made to Art. 32 (2) VCLT which specifies the 
relevant legal ‘context’ for purposes of interpretation. 
 
107 Art. 61 VCLT.  See, further, Case Concerning Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, 
supra n. 76, at  pp. 56-64.  
 
108 Art. 62 VCLT (‘A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with 
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not forseen by 
the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty 
unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of 
the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform 
the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty’). For an early appraisal see 
generally, C. Hill, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus (Columbia: University of Missouri, 
1934). See, also, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex Case: France v. Switzerland, 
Comment [3]: PLEASE	CLARIFY	WHICH	
PHASE	OF	THE	FREE	ZONES	CASE	YOUR	
REF	IN	FN	108	IS	TO.	
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relate the act of ‘consenting’ or ‘promising’ to a particular social, political (and 
perhaps even legal)110 context, and then offer the possibility of excusing one party 
from an obligation of performance by reason of some extraneous change in that 
external environment.  It is only here that the act of consenting to obligation appears 
to be understood as a social experience, as opposed to a highly formalized act.  
Consent not being the abstract formal decision of a legal actor in hypothetical space, 
but that of a concrete, socially-situated, actor seeking to secure certain material 
objectives in a given political and social environment.   
 
On the face of it, there is a significant contrast to be drawn, here, between the 
socially-aware form of consent which is recognized in these principles, and the more 
abstract or formal conception employed in case of duress, or indeed the more 
‘authentic’ or ‘consensual’ idea that operates in case of succession.  In case of duress, 
for example, a world is constructed in which power becomes visible only in case of 
unlawful violence. Other forms of economic and political pressure that might in 
practice be influential, lack legibility. In case of succession, relations of domination 
and subordination might form the intelligible backdrop to the distinction between 
‘new’ and ‘old’ States, but these are once again reduced to formal categories 
determined by whether the territory in question was formerly describable as 
‘dependent’ prior to the moment of independence. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
in the drafting of the Vienna Convention, some States saw in the doctrine rebus sic 
stantibus a vital response to the problem of unequal, or imposed, treaties.111 
 
																																																																																																																																																														
PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, (1932) pp. 156-8; Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, PCIJ, 
Series B, No. 4 (1923), p. 29 and Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra n. 87, at p. 18. 
 
109 As Fitzmaurice describes it ‘where a supervening impossibility does arise, a 
change of circumstances, and an essential one, must have occurred.  But although the case of 
impossibility might therefore be represented as being one of rebus sic stantibus, it is clear that 
the latter principle is not limited to cases of actual impossibility.’ G.G. Fitzmaurice, Second 
Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/107 (1957) p. 60. See, also, Commentary 
to Art. 58, Yrbk. ILC, 1966, 255-256. 
 
110 See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra n. 87, at p. 17. 
 
111 See, also, Denunciation of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 2 November 1865, PCIJ 
(1929), Series A, No. 18, I, p. 52. 
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But even then, appearances are somewhat deceptive – in case of fundamental change, 
what is in question is less the experience or intentions of the subject (which only 
remain relevant so far as determining whether or not the change was ‘foreseen by the 
parties’), 112  still less with a straightforward evaluation as to whether the 
transformation of the external environment made it implausible to insist upon 
continued performance.113 Rather, it involves identifying the ‘essential basis’ for 
consent (quite independently of the question of motive), and then determining 
whether the change was such as to ‘radically’ transform the extent of obligations to be 
performed. The impugned treaty, in other words, has to be both obsolete and 
oppressive not just one in isolation from the other. 
 
This analytic appears to tell us two things about consent. First, that it is to be 
recognized as having a social context from which the meaning of an act of consent 
partially draws sustenance. Consent has a time and place and certain material 
conditions to which it is invisibly tied. That context, however, does not condition 
consent in the sense of determining its formal validity or effect ab initio, but emerges 
as a ground for termination only in circumstances in which it is deemed to have 
changed.  Secondly, the central intuition would appear to be that the social/political 
context in which the expression of consent is embedded must be conceptualized as 
expressive of some kind of ‘natural condition’, such that any change in that status quo 																																																								
 
112 Earlier authors had preferred to treat the ‘clausula’ as an implied term. See, e.g., 
Brierly, supra n. 9, at p. 336 (‘the treaty is ended because we can infer from its terms that the 
parties, though they have not said expressly what was to happen in the event which has 
occurred, would, if they had forseen it, have said that the treaty ought to lapse.’). Waldock 
and Fitzmaurice, amongst others, sought to provide it with an ‘objective’ basis.  See G.G. 
Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/107 (1957) pp. 58-60.  
As Fitzmaurice describes it, the rebus may be considered ‘as a rule which, irrespective of 
anything expressed or implied in the treaty, may give the parties a faculty to take steps 
directed to the revision or termination of the treaty, operates independently of the will of the 
parties except at the point where a party invokes it.’  See, also, H. Waldock, Second Report 
on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (1963), pp. 79-85. See generally, Commentary 
to draft Art. 59, Yrbk. ILC, II, pp. 256-260 (esp. paragraph 7: ‘In most cases the parties gave 
no thought to the possibility of a change of circumstances and, if they had done so, would 
probably have provided for it in a different manner … the theory of an implied term must be 
rejected’). 
 
113 See, e.g., Brierly, supra n. 9, at p. 332 (‘It may be, therefore, that if international 
law insists too rigidly on the binding force of treaties, it will merely defeat its own purpose by 
encouraging their violation’). 
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must be resisted, and resisted in the name of ‘law’.114 Whilst this may leave us with 
the impression that international law simply operates to conserve an existing order of 
power—visibly opposing attempts to question the authority of ‘agreements’ 
underpinned by ‘legitimate’ threats—the more important point, as I have been trying 
to suggest, is that it asks us to take seriously the world that ‘consent to obligation’ 
evokes into being. 
 
6. Conclusion 
If the regime of the law of treaties as articulated in the Vienna Convention(s) might be 
thought to organize itself around the legitimating idea of ‘consent to obligation’, 
consent is only nominally the starting point.  Its principal function, one may imagine, 
is to immunize international legal obligation from a critique of power politics: 
instantiating in the form of the contract, the principle of sovereign equality, and the 
idea of self-rule. Its pedagogy thus is one of virtue and restraint. It is clear, however, 
that even this idea of self-rule can never be just ‘rule of the self’. It must always be 
conditioned, regularized, encased in rules and their exceptions, and organized as a 
social category.  And the Vienna Convention, one may think, does precisely that job.  
From this vantage point, one may simply ask how coherently it does that? How ‘free’ 
does it leave consent? What constraints may impinge upon it? 
 
But there is another account of the Convention that I have been trying to sketch out 
here, which starts in a different place. Rather than suppose the pre-existence of a 
phenomenological category of State consent and then look at how it is organized and 
controlled, I have been trying to think of it as an idea (or set of ideas) produced or 
generated, in part at least, through the terms of the Vienna Convention. The 
hypothesis here is that State consent acquires meaning only at the point at which it is 
controlled or regularized—that it appears only through the act of its apparent 
limitation. From this standpoint, the Convention assumes a very different guise: 																																																								
114 It is in this sense that the doctrine was closely related to the ‘problem of peaceful 
change’. See, e.g., Q. Wright, ‘Article 19 of the League Covenant and the Doctrine of “Rebus 
sic Stantibus”’, Proceedings ASIL, 30 (1936), 55-73, at 59 (‘Every legal system in a 
progressive society needs procedures for changing the law in order to keep it abreast of the 
sociological facts of the community, and procedures by which the members of the community 
can acquire and transfer rights within the law … But such extraordinary procedures must be 
resorted to with restraint and under the authority of the community as a whole, or the society 
will cease to be one of law’). 
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operating as a way of enjoining us to believe in the reality of ‘consent’, inciting us to 
organize our conceptions of coercion in a way that does not displace the (apparent) 
reality of sovereign free-will, encouraging the acting out of a set of ceremonial 
formalities the overall purpose of which being to generate the idea of faith, obligation 
and belief in law. To pursue this line of thought is to think of consent, not as the 
beginning of our enquiry, but as the end: as the ideational output of a machinery of 
consent-formation with its own forms of capital, labour and exchange. 
